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The role of cooperation in spatially explicit
economical systems
Nicolas Lanchier∗ and Stephanie Reed
Abstract This paper is concerned with a model in econophysics, the subfield of statistical
physics that applies concepts from traditional physics to economics. In our model, economical
agents are represented by the vertices of a connected graph and are characterized by the
number of coins they possess. Agents independently spend one coin at rate one for their basic
need, earn one coin at a rate chosen independently from a fixed distribution φ and exchange
money at rate µ with one of their nearest neighbors, with the richest neighbor giving one
coin to the other neighbor. If an agent needs to spend one coin when her fortune is at zero,
she dies, i.e., the corresponding vertex is removed from the graph. Our first results focus
on the two extreme cases of lack of cooperation µ = 0 and perfect cooperation µ = ∞ for
finite connected graphs. These results suggest that, when overall the agents earn more than
they spend, cooperation is beneficial for the survival of the population, whereas when overall
the agents earn less than they spend, cooperation becomes detrimental. The infinite one-
dimensional system is also studied. In this case, when the agents earn less than they spend in
average, the density of agents that die eventually is bounded from below by a positive constant
that does not depend on the initial number of coins per agent or the level of cooperation.
1. Introduction
Models in econophysics typically consist of large systems of economical agents who earn, spend
and exchange money. For a review of such models, we refer the reader to [7]. These models so far
have mainly been studied by statistical physicists. From a mathematical point of view, they fall
into the category of stochastic processes known as interacting particle systems [4, 6]. The most
basic model in econophysics has been studied in [3] based on numerical simulations but was also
considered earlier in [1, 2]. This model consists of a system of n interacting economical agents that
are characterized by the number of dollars they possess, and evolves as follows: at each time step,
an agent chosen uniformly at random gives one dollar to another agent again chosen uniformly at
random, unless the first agent has no money in which case nothing happens. The main conjecture
about this model is that, when the number of agents and the money temperature, defined as the
average amount of money per agent, are both large, the limiting distribution of money is well
approximated by the exponential distribution with parameter the money temperature.
Spatially explicit versions of this model where agents are located on the vertices of a finite
connected graph and can only exchange money with their nearest neighbors have been recently
introduced and studied analytically in [5]. The non-spatial model considered in [3] is simply obtained
by assuming that the underlying graph is the complete graph with n vertices. It is proved in [5]
that the conjecture in [3] is indeed correct and in fact holds for all spatially explicit versions, not
only the process on the complete graph.
In this paper, we study variants of the spatially explicit models [5] where agents also earn
money, spend money and die if they run out of money. In addition, we assume that the exchange of
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money occurs in a cooperative setting, meaning that the flow of money is exclusively directed from
“rich” agents to “poor” agents. We also follow the framework of interacting particle systems [6]
by assuming that the process evolves in continuous rather than in discrete time. This approach
will allow us to define the system on infinite graphs using an idea of Harris [4] that consists in
constructing the process from a collection of independent Poisson processes.
Model description. To define our spatial model formally, we let G = (V ,E ) be a finite or infinite
locally finite connected graph. Each vertex represents an economical agent who is either alive and
characterized by the amount of money she possesses, or dead. To fix the ideas, we assume that the
amount of money agents who are alive possess is a nonnegative integer representing a number of
credits or coins, while we use the state −1 for dead agents. In particular, the state of the system
at time t is a spatial configuration
ξt : V −→ {−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}
with the value of ξt(x) indicating that agent x is dead or representing the number of coins this
agent possesses when she is alive. To define the evolution rules, we attach to each vertex x ∈ V a
random variable φx chosen independently from a fixed distribution φ. The individual at vertex x
earns one coin at rate φx and, to ensure her survival, spends one coin at rate one. The population
is also characterized by its level of cooperation which is measured using a nonnegative parameter µ
as follows: nearest neighbors that are alive interact at rate µ and, in case one neighbor has at least
two more coins than the other neighbor, she gives one coin to the other neighbor. In particular, the
“richest” agent before the interaction does not give any coin if this makes her “poorer” than her
neighbor. Finally, if an individual has zero coin at the time she needs to spend one coin then she
dies and the corresponding vertex is removed from the graph. To describe the dynamics formally,
for each spatial configuration ξ, we let
spending ξ−x (z) = ξ(z)− 1{z = x} for all z ∈ V
earning ξ+x (z) = ξ(z) + 1{z = x} for all z ∈ V
be the configurations obtained respectively by removing/adding one coin at vertex x. Also, for each
edge (x, y) ∈ E of the network of interactions, we let
cooperation ξ(x,y)(z) = ξ(z) + 1{ξ(x) < ξ(y)− 1}(1{z = x} − 1{z = y})
+ 1{ξ(y) < ξ(x)− 1}(1{z = y} − 1{z = x})
be the configuration obtained by moving one coin from the richer to the poorer vertex if the two
vertices are at least two coins apart. The dynamics of the system is then described by the Markov
generator L defined on the set of cylinder functions by
Lf(ξ) =
∑
x∈V (f(ξ
−
x )− f(ξ))1{ξ(x) 6= −1}
+
∑
x∈V φx (f(ξ
+
x )− f(ξ))1{ξ(x) 6= −1}
+
∑
(x,y)∈E µ (f(ξ(x,y))− f(ξ))1{ξ(x) 6= −1, ξ(y) 6= −1}.
The first sum describes the rate at which vertices spend one coin, the second sum the rate at which
they earn one coin, and the third sum the rate at which neighbors exchange one coin. As previously
mentioned, the process is well defined on locally finite graphs, including infinite graphs, and can be
constructed from a collection of independent Poisson processes. More precisely,
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• for all x ∈ V , let N−t (x) be a Poisson process with intensity one,
• for all x ∈ V , let N+t (x) be a Poisson process with intensity φx,
• for all (x, y) ∈ E , let Nt(x, y) be a Poisson process with intensity µ.
We further assume that these processes are independent. This implies that, with probability one,
the arrival times are all distinct. A general result due to Harris [4] then shows that the process can
be constructed using the following rules:
• At the arrival times of the Poisson process N−t (x), we take one coin from the individual at
vertex x if this individual is still alive.
• At the arrival times of the Poisson process N+t (x), we give one coin to the individual at
vertex x if this individual is still alive.
• At the arrival times of N+t (x, y), we move one coin from x to y if x has at least two more
coins than y or one coin from y to x if y has at least two more coins than x.
Main results. To begin with, we compare the two processes with the same earning rates φz in the
absence of cooperation µ = 0 and in the presence of perfect cooperation µ =∞ on finite connected
graphs to understand whether cooperation is beneficial or detrimental for survival. Our first results
look at the probability of global survival that we define as
pµ(c, (φz)) = P (ξt(z) 6= −1 for all (z, t) ∈ V × R+ | ξ0 ≡ c)
where c refers to the common initial number of coins per agent and where the earning rates φz are
independent realizations of the distribution φ for all z ∈ V . Estimates for the probability of global
survival can be expressed in terms of the two key quantities
D = maxx∈V
∑
z∈V d(x, z) and Φ = (1/n)
∑
z∈V φz (1)
where d refers to the graph distance and n to the population size. Using that, as long as all the
agents are alive, the total number of coins on the graph behaves like a random walk that increases
at rate nΦ and decreases at rate n together with the fact that nearest neighbors are at most one
coin apart in the presence of perfect cooperation, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 1 – In the presence of perfect cooperation µ =∞,
p∞(c, (φz)) ≥ max (0, 1− Φ
−(nc−D+1)).
The proof relies, among other things, on an application of the optional stopping theorem for mar-
tingales. The inequality in the statement turns out to be an equality when n = 1. In particular,
since the system in the absence of cooperation behaves like n independent copies of a one-person
system, the theorem also gives the probability of global survival when µ = 0. Using this and some
basic algebra, it can be proved that, when Φ > 1 and c is large, the probability of global survival
is larger in the presence of perfect cooperation than in the absence of cooperation.
Theorem 2 – Assume that Φ > 1. Then, there exists c0 <∞ such that,
p0(c, (φz)) =
∏
z∈V max (0, 1 − φ
−(c+1)
z )
≤ max (0, 1− Φ−(nc−D+1)) ≤ p∞(c, (φz)) for all c ≥ c0.
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More generally, we conjecture that, when Φ > 1, i.e., when overall the agents earn more than they
spend, the probability of global survival is larger in the presence of perfect cooperation than in the
absence of cooperation regardless of the initial value c.
We now focus on the two-person system: we set V = {x, y} and assume that vertices x and y
are connected by an edge. In this case, Theorem 1 implies that when
Φ = (1/2)(φx + φy) > 1 and φx < 1 < φy
global survival is possible in the presence of perfect cooperation whereas individual x dies almost
surely in the absence of cooperation, showing again that cooperation is beneficial. Cooperation,
however, becomes detrimental when
Φ = (1/2)(φx + φy) < 1 and φx < 1 < φy.
In this case, regardless of the level of cooperation µ, global survival is not possible so, to measure
the effect of cooperation, we study instead
Eµ(c, (φz)) = E(card{z ∈ V : ξt(z) 6= −1 for all t ∈ R+ | ξ0 ≡ c),
the expected number of individuals that live forever. Due to perfect cooperation and the fact that
individual x dies almost surely, it can be proved that the last time both individuals each have one
coin is almost surely finite and that, between this time and the first time one of the two individuals
dies, the process behaves according to a certain seven-state Markov chain. Using a first-step analysis
to study this Markov chain and part of the proof of Theorem 1, the expected value of the number
of individuals that live forever can be computed explicitly.
Theorem 3 – Assume that V = E = {x, y} and that
Φ = (1/2)(φx + φy) < 1 and φx < 1 < φy.
Then, letting Ψ = 8 + 2φx + 2φy, for all c ≥ 1,
E∞(c, φx, φy) =
(
2
Ψ
)(
1−
1
φy
)
+
(
φy
Ψ
+
1
4
)(
1−
(
1
φy
)2)
< 1−
(
1
φy
)c+1
= E0(c, φx, φy).
Our approach to prove this result works in theory for all complete graphs, but becomes computa-
tionally intractable even with only three vertices. More generally, we conjecture that, at least on
the complete graph and when Φ < 1, i.e., when overall the agents earn less than they spend, the
expected number of individuals that live forever is larger in the absence of cooperation than in
the presence of perfect cooperation. In a nutshell, we conjecture that cooperation is beneficial for
populations that are “productive” but detrimental for populations that are not.
Finally, we look at the infinite system in one dimension: the underlying graph is represented by
the integers with each integer being connected to its predecessor and to its successor. In this case,
the process is more difficult to study because the graph is infinite. The next result shows that, when
the expected value of φ is less than one, the density of individuals who die eventually in the infinite
one-dimensional system is bounded from below by a positive constant that does not depend on the
initial number of coins per agent.
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Theorem 4 – Assume that E(φ) < 1. Then,
lim
n→∞
1
2n+ 1
n∑
z=−n
1{ξt(z) = −1 for some t} = l
where l > 0 does not depend on the initial fortune c per vertex.
To prove this result, we first identify a collection of events that ensure that a given agent dies
before time one. This, together with the ergodic theorem, implies that the density of agents that
die before time one is positive. This density, however, depends a priori on the initial fortune. Then,
we define a sink as a vertex such that the agents in any finite interval that contains this vertex earn
overall less than they spend. The law of large numbers implies that the density of sinks is bounded
from below by a constant that does not depend on the initial fortune. Using finally that, at time
one, each sink is located between two agents who already died, we use a recursive argument to
prove that each sink dies eventually. In conclusion, the density of individuals who die eventually is
bounded from below by the density of sinks which, in turn, is bounded from below by a positive
constant that does not depend on the initial fortune. This gives the result.
The proof of Theorem 4 also suggests that, when the expected value of φ is larger than one,
the density of agents who live forever can be made arbitrarily close to one by choosing the initial
fortune c large enough. The proof of this result, however, requires additional arguments that we
were not able to make rigorous.
2. Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
In this section, we start by collecting some preliminary results about martingales that will be used
later to prove the first two theorems. The first step is to estimate probabilities related to the
continuous-time Markov chain (Wt) with transition rates
limǫ→0 ǫ
−1 P (Wt+ǫ =Wt + 1) =
∑
z∈V φz
limǫ→0 ǫ
−1 P (Wt+ǫ =Wt − 1) = card(V ) = n.
(2)
Recall from (1) that Φ = (1/n)
∑
z∈V φz.
Lemma 5 – The process (Φ−Wt) is a martingale.
Proof. Letting (Ft) denote the natural filtration of the process (Wt), and recalling the expression
of its transition rates in (2), we get
limǫ→0 ǫ
−1E(Φ−Wt+ǫ − Φ−Wt |Ft)
= (
∑
z∈V φz)(Φ
−(Wt+1) − Φ−Wt) + n (Φ−(Wt−1) − Φ−Wt)
= nΦ (Φ−(Wt+1) − Φ−Wt) + n (Φ−(Wt−1) − Φ−Wt)
= n (Φ−Wt − Φ−(Wt−1)) + n (Φ−(Wt−1) −Φ−Wt) = 0,
which shows that (Φ−Wt) is a martingale. 
To state our next results, we define the stopping times
Ti = inf {t : Wt = i} for all i ∈ Z.
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Lemma 6 – Assume that M ≤ nc ≤ N and Φ 6= 1. Then,
p(M,N) = P (TN < TM |W0 = nc) =
1− Φ−(nc−M)
1− Φ−(N−M)
.
Proof. Since (Φ−Wt) is a martingale and the process stopped at time T = min(TM , TN ) is bounded,
we may apply the optional stopping theorem to get
E(Φ−WT ) = E(Φ−W0) = Φ−nc. (3)
Note also that
E(Φ−WT ) = E(Φ−WT |T = TM )(1 − p(M,N)) + E(Φ
−WT |T = TN ) p(M,N)
= Φ−M (1− p(M,N)) + Φ−N p(M,N)
= (Φ−N − Φ−M ) p(M,N) + Φ−M .
(4)
Combining (3) and (4), we conclude that
p(M,N) =
Φ−nc − Φ−M
Φ−N − Φ−M
=
1− Φ−(nc−M)
1−Φ−(N−M)
.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 7 – For all M ≤ nc and all Φ > 0,
q(M) = P (TM =∞|W0 = nc) = max (0, 1 − Φ
−(nc−M)).
Proof. We distinguish three cases depending on the value of Φ.
• When Φ = 1, the process (Wt) is the one-dimensional symmetric random walk which is known
to be recurrent. This gives the probability P (TM =∞) = 0.
• When Φ < 1, the law of large numbers implies that Wt → −∞ almost surely. In particular,
the stopping time TM is again almost surely finite and the probability q(M) = 0.
• When Φ > 1, the law of large numbers now gives Wt →∞ so
{TM =∞} = {TN < TM for all N ≥ nc} almost surely.
Since in addition we have the inclusions
{TN+1 < TM} ⊂ {TN < TM} for all N ≥ nc,
by monotone convergence and Lemma 6, we get
q(M) = P (TN < TM for all N ≥ nc |W0 = nc)
= P (limN→∞ {TN < TM} |W0 = nc)
= limN→∞ P (TN < TM |W0 = nc) = 1− Φ
−(nc−M).
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Observing also that 1−Φ−(nc−M) ≤ 0 if and only if Φ ≤ 1 gives the result. 
Lemma 7 is the main ingredient to prove Theorem 1. To see the connection between the previ-
ous martingale results and the economical system, define
τ = inf {t : ξt(x) = −1 for some x ∈ V } and Zt =
∑
z∈V ξt(z)
and observe that, before time τ , the individual at z is alive, earns one coin at rate φz and spends
one coin at rate one, therefore
limǫ→0 ǫ
−1 P (Zt+ǫ = Zt + 1 | τ > t) =
∑
z∈V φz
limǫ→0 ǫ
−1 P (Zt+ǫ = Zt − 1 | τ > t) = card(V ) = n.
In other words, by time τ , the total number of coins behaves like the Markov chain (Wt). Using
this and the previous lemma, we can now prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. In the limiting case µ = ∞ and as long as all the individuals are alive,
each time an individual has at least two more coins than one of her neighbors, this individual
instantaneously gives a coin to one of her poorest neighbors, therefore
|ξt(x)− ξt(y)| ≤ 1 for all (x, y) ∈ E and t < τ.
Now, letting x, y ∈ V be arbitrary, there exist
z0 = x, z1, . . . , zd = y ∈ V such that (zi, zi+1) ∈ E for all i = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1
where d = d(x, y). In particular, the triangle inequality implies that
|ξt(x)− ξt(y)| ≤ |ξt(z0)− ξt(z1)|+ · · ·+ |ξt(zd−1)− ξt(zd)|
≤ d = d(x, y)
(5)
for all t < τ . Now, on the event that τ < ∞, just before that time, there is at least one vertex,
say x, with zero coin, while the other vertices have a positive fortune. This, together with (5),
implies that the total number of coins satisfies
Zτ− =
∑
z∈V ξτ−(z) =
∑
z∈V |ξτ−(x)− ξτ−(z)| ≤
∑
z∈V d(x, z).
Taking the maximum over all possible configurations gives
Zτ− ≤ maxx∈V
∑
z∈V d(x, z) = D .
Finally, using Lemma 7 and observing that all the individuals survive if and only if τ =∞ give the
following lower bound for the probability of global survival
p∞(c, (φz)) = P (τ =∞| ξ0(z) = c for all z ∈ V )
≥ P (Zt ≥ D for all t | ξ0(z) = c for all z ∈ V )
= P (Wt > D − 1 for all t |W0 = nc)
= P (TD−1 =∞|W0 = nc) = q(D − 1)
= max (0, 1 − Φ−(nc−D+1)).
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This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Using Lemma 7 and Theorem 1, we can now prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. It follows from Lemma 7 that, in the presence of only one vertex, say x,
the probability of survival is given by
p0(c, φx) = q(−1) = max (0, 1 − φ
−(c+1)
x ).
Since in the absence of cooperation µ = 0, the system with n individuals consists of n independent
copies of a one-person system, we get
p0(c, (φz)) =
∏
z∈V p0(c, φz) =
∏
z∈V max (0, 1 − φ
−(c+1)
z ).
It directly follows that
p0(c, (φz)) = 0 when φz ≤ 1 for some z ∈ V
so the inequality to be proved is obvious in this case. Assume now that φz > 1 for all z ∈ V . In
this case, we have the following inequalities:
log (p0(c, (φz))) =
∑
z∈V log (1− φ
−(c+1)
z ) ≤ −
∑
z∈V φ
−(c+1)
z
log (p∞(c, (φz))) ≥ log(1− Φ
−(nc−D+1)) ≥ −Φ−(nc−D+1)/(1 − Φ−(nc−D+1)).
In particular, since Φ > 1, for all n ≥ 2 and c sufficiently large,
log (p∞(c, (φz))) ≥ −Φ
−(nc−D+1)/(1− Φ−(nc−D+1))
≥ −2Φ−(nc−D+1) ≥ −2 (minz∈V φz)
−(nc−D+1)
≥ −(minz∈V φz)
−(c+1) ≥ −
∑
z∈V φ
−(c+1)
z
≥ log (p0(c, (φz))).
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
3. Proof of Theorem 3
As stated in the introduction, the two-person system is simple enough that we may calculate certain
probabilities by hand. Since there are only two vertices, we will call them x and y and the rates at
which they earn a coin φx and φy, respectively. To simplify the notation, write
Xt = ξt(x) and Yt = ξt(y) for all t ≥ 0.
Letting T− = inf {t : min(Xt, Yt) = −1}, the process
Φ−(Xt∧T−+Yt∧T−) =
(
2
φx + φy
)Xt∧T−+Yt∧T−
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is again a martingale. Using that the individuals’ fortune differ by at most one coin in the presence
of perfect cooperation, and repeating the proofs of Lemmas 6 and 7, we easily show that, when
both individuals start with c coins, the probability of global survival satisfies
p∞(c, φx, φy) = P (min(Xt, Yt) ≥ 0 for all t |X0 = Y0 = c)
≥ P (Xt + Yt > 0 for all t |X0 = Y0 = c)
= max (0, 1 − (2/(φx + φy))
2c)
in the case of perfect cooperation. In particular, when
φx + φy > 2 and φx < 1 < φy,
while individual x dies almost surely in the absence of cooperation, global survival is possible in the
presence of perfect cooperation, showing that cooperation is beneficial in this case. We now focus
on the parameter region
φx + φy < 2 and φx < 1 < φy (6)
and show that, in this case, cooperation is detrimental: individual x again dies almost surely while
individual y is more likely to live forever in the absence of cooperation than in the presence of
perfect cooperation. The probability of survival can be computed explicitly.
Using again that the individuals’ fortune differ by at most one coin in the presence of perfect
cooperation, together with the fact that global survival is not possible when (6) holds, implies that
the stopping time T− is almost surely finite and that
(XT− , YT−) ∈ {(−1, 0), (−1, 1), (0,−1), (1,−1)}.
To simplify the notation, we rename these four states as well as the three adjacent states as shown
in Figure 1 and define the stopping times and corresponding probabilities
τi = inf {t : (Xt, Yt) = Si} and pi = P (T− = τi) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The probabilities pi are computed explicitly in the next lemma.
Lemma 8 – Assume (6) and perfect cooperation. Then,
p1 = p2 = 2/Ψ p3 = φx/Ψ+ 1/4 p4 = φy/Ψ + 1/4
where Ψ = 8 + 2φx + 2φy.
Proof. Observe that T− is almost surely finite when (6) holds. Since in addition the individuals’
fortune differ by at most one coin before time T−,
T+ = sup {t : Xt = Yt = 1} <∞ almost surely.
Also, between time T+ and time T−, the process consists of the seven-state continuous-time Markov
chain whose transition rates are indicated in Figure 1. Referring again to the picture for the name
of the states, we define the conditional probabilities
pij = P (T− = τi | (X0, Y0) = Sj) for all (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} × {5, 6, 7}.
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1
1
φy
φx
1
1
1 1
Xt = −1 Xt = 0 Xt = 1
S5
Yt = −1
Yt = 0
Yt = 1
S2
S1 S3
S4
S6
S7
Figure 1. The seven states and transition rates between times T+ and T−.
Using a first-step analysis and looking at the probabilities at which the process starting from
state S5 jumps to each of the four adjacent states, we get
p15 =
1
2 + φx + φy
+
φx p16
2 + φx + φy
+
φy p17
2 + φx + φy
.
The same idea gives p16 = p17 = (1/2) p15. Solving the system, we get
p15 =
2
4 + φx + φy
and p16 = p17 =
1
4 + φx + φy
.
Since in addition the first state visited after time T+ is equally likely to be S6 and S7, we conclude
that the probability p1 is given by
p1 =
p16 + p17
2
=
1
4 + φx + φy
=
2
Ψ
which, by symmetry, is also the value of p2. To compute p3, we again use a first-step analysis to
obtain a system involving the three conditional probabilities:
p35 =
φx p36
2 + φx + φy
+
φy p37
2 + φx + φy
p36 =
1
2
+
p35
2
p37 =
p35
2
.
Solving the system gives
p35 =
φx
4 + φx + φy
p36 =
1
2
+
φx
8 + 2φx + 2φy
p37 =
φx
8 + 2φx + 2φy
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from which it follows as before that
p3 =
p36 + p37
2
=
φx
8 + 2φx + 2φy
+
1
4
=
φx
Ψ
+
1
4
.
By symmetry, the value of p4 is obtained by exchanging the role of φx and φy in the previous
expression, which completes the proof. 
Using the previous lemma as well as Lemma 7 and conditioning on the first boundary state vis-
ited, we deduce that the expected number of individuals that survive in the presence of perfect
cooperation, which is also the probability that y survives, is given by
E∞(c, φx, φy) = p2 p0(0, φy) + p4 p0(1, φy) =
(
2
Ψ
)(
1−
1
φy
)
+
(
φy
Ψ
+
1
4
)(
1−
(
1
φy
)2)
.
Since in addition
1−
1
φy
< 1−
(
1
φy
)2
≤ 1−
(
1
φy
)c+1
for all φy > 1 and c ≥ 1, and since
(
2
Ψ
)
+
(
φy
Ψ
+
1
4
)
= P (T− = τ2 or T− = τ4) ≤ 1,
we conclude that
E∞(c, φx, φy) < 1−
(
1
φy
)c+1
= E0(c, φx, φy).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
4. Proof of Theorem 4
As explained in the introduction, the first step to prove Theorem 4 is to identify a collection of
events that simultaneously occur with positive probability and ensure that a given vertex, say the
origin, dies before time one. These events are defined from the collection of independent Poisson
processes introduced at the end of the model description as follows:
A1 = {N
+
1 (0) = 0 and N
−
1 (0) ≥ (c+ 1)
2}
A2 = {N
+
1 (z) = N
−
1 (z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z such that 0 < |z| ≤ c+ 1}
A3 = {N
+
1 (c+ 2) + · · ·+N
+
1 (c+ n+ 1) ≤ n for all n > 0}
A4 = {N
+
1 (−(c+ 2)) + · · ·+N
+
1 (−(c+ n+ 1)) ≤ n for all n > 0}.
The times at which neighbors exchange a coin are unimportant in the proof of the theorem. Let A
be the event that consists of the intersection of these four events.
Lemma 9 – For all µ ∈ [0,∞], we have P (ξ1(0) = −1 |A) = 1.
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 041 2 1
c + 1
1 coin
2 coins
3 coins
4 coins
−(c + 1) c + 1
Figure 2. Typical configuration at time one when A occurs: the agent at 0 is dead and the fortune of the agents at
distance at least c+ 2 from the origin is below the black dashed line. The numbers at the bottom of the picture give
the number of coins these agents earned by time one. In the picture, we assume that these agents do not spend any
coin, in which case the fortune of the agents within distance c+ 1 of the origin is above the white dashed line.
Proof. To begin with, we ignore the exchange of money between c+ 1 and its right neighbor and
between −(c+1) and its left neighbor. Recalling that an agent can receive one coin from a neighbor
only if this neighbor has at least two more coins, on the event A1 ∩A2,
ξ1(0) = −1 and c ≥ ξt(z) ≥ |z| − 1 for all 0 < |z| ≤ c+ 1 and t ∈ (0, 1). (7)
Note that the second inequality above becomes an equality when µ =∞. In this case, the total loss
of coins among the 2c+ 3 vertices around zero is given by
(c+ 1) + 2c+ 2(c− 1) + · · ·+ 2× 1 + 2× 0 = (c+ 1)2,
which explains our definition of the event A1. Observe that (7) implies that there are exactly c coins
at vertex c+ 1 until time one. In particular, looking at the full system and allowing the exchange
of money between c+ 1 and its right neighbor, on the event A3,
number of coins traveling c+ 1→ c+ 2 by time one
≥ number of coins traveling c+ 2→ c+ 1 by time one.
(8)
By symmetry, on the event A4,
number of coins traveling −(c+ 1)→ −(c+ 2) by time one
≥ number of coins traveling −(c+ 2)→ −(c+ 1) by time one.
(9)
Combining (7)–(9), we deduce that given the event A we must have ξ1(0) = −1. 
To prove that the event A has a positive probability, we let
ǫ = −(1/2)(E(φ) − 1) > 0 so that E(φ) = 1− 2ǫ
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and call vertex z ∈ Z
a right ǫ-sink when φz + φz+1 + · · · + φz+n ≤ (n + 1)(1 − ǫ) for all n ∈ N
a left ǫ-sink when φz + φz−1 + · · · + φz−n ≤ (n + 1)(1 − ǫ) for all n ∈ N.
Then, we have the following result.
Lemma 10 – We have P (z is a right ǫ-sink) = P (z is a right ǫ-sink) = a > 0.
Proof. Define the process
Xn = Xn(z) = φz + φz+1 + · · · + φz+n − (n+ 1)(1 − ǫ) for all n ∈ N.
Since the random variables φz, φz+1, . . . , φz+n are independent and identically distributed, it follows
from the strong law of large numbers that
lim
n→∞
Xn
n+ 1
= lim
n→∞
1
n+ 1
n∑
i=0
(φz+i − (1− ǫ)) = E(φ)− (1− ǫ) = −ǫ < 0.
In particular, there exists N , fixed from now on, such that
P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n ≥ N) = P
( n∑
i=1
(φz+i − (1− ǫ)) ≤ 0 for all n ≥ N
)
≥ 1/2. (10)
In addition, since E(φ) < 1− ǫ, we have p = P (φ ≤ 1− ǫ) > 0 so
P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n < N) ≥ P (φz+i ≤ 1− ǫ for all i < N) = p
N > 0. (11)
Finally, combining (10) and (11) and using that the events {Xn ≤ 0} for different values of n ∈ N
are positively correlated, we conclude that
P (z is a right ǫ-sink) = P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n ≥ 0)
= P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n ≥ N |Xn ≤ 0 for all n < N)P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n < N)
≥ P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n ≥ N)P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n < N) ≥ (1/2) p
N > 0.
It also follows from obvious symmetry that the probability that z is a left ǫ-sink is equal to the
probability that it is a right ǫ-sink. This completes the proof. 
Using the previous lemma, we can now prove that the event A has positive probability.
Lemma 11 – We have P (A) > 0.
Proof. Since the Poisson processes in the graphical representation are independent
P (A) = P (A1)P (A2)P (A3)P (A4).
In addition, for any given c finite, the first two events have positive probability while, by symmetry,
the last two events have the same probability, i.e.,
P (A1)P (A2) > 0 and P (A3) = P (A4). (12)
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In particular, to conclude, it suffices to prove that the event A3 has a positive probability. By
conditioning on the event that vertex c+ 2 is a right ǫ-sink, we get
P (A3) ≥ P (A3 | c+ 2 is a right ǫ-sink)P (c + 2 is a right ǫ-sink)
= aP (A3 | c+ 2 is a right ǫ-sink)
(13)
where a > 0 according to Lemma 10. Now, let
Yn = Poisson (n (1− ǫ)) be independent for all n > 0.
Using that the events that define the event A3 are positively correlated and recalling the definition
of right ǫ-sink, we deduce that
P (A3 | c+ 2 is a right ǫ-sink) ≥ P (Yn ≤ n for all n > 0) =
∏
n>0 P (Yn ≤ n). (14)
In other respects,
∏
n>0 P (Yn ≤ n) > 0 if and only if
∑
n>0 − log(1− P (Yn > n)) <∞
if and only if
∑
n>0 P (Yn > n) <∞
(15)
which follows from standard large deviations estimates for the Poisson distribution. Combin-
ing (13)–(15), we deduce that P (A3) > 0 which, together with (12), gives the lemma. 
Since the random variables φz are independent and identically distributed, we may apply the
ergodic theorem together with Lemmas 9 and 11 to deduce that
lim
n→∞
1
2n+ 1
n∑
z=−n
1{ξ1(z) = −1} ≥ P (A) > 0. (16)
Note however that this does not imply our theorem since the probability of A1 ∩A2, and therefore
the lower bound P (A), depends on c, the initial number of coins per vertex.
The second step of the proof is to identify an infinite collection of vertices, that we call ǫ-sinks,
that are removed eventually. The density of such vertices is bounded from below by a positive
constant that does not depend on c. More precisely, we call vertex z ∈ Z an ǫ-sink if
φz−m + φz−m+1 + · · ·+ φz+n ≤ (m+ n+ 1)(1 − ǫ) for all m,n ∈ N. (17)
Lemma 12 – We have P (z is an ǫ-sink) ≥ a2 > 0.
Proof. Let Am,n be the event in (17) and observe that
Am,0 ∩A0,n ⊂ Am,n for all m,n ∈ N.
In particular, the event that z is an ǫ-sink is
⋂
m,n
Am,n =
⋂
m,n
(Am,0 ∩A0,n) =
(⋂
m
Am,0
)
∩
(⋂
n
A0,n
)
. (18)
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sink
T0
T1
T2
T3
T4
z−t z
+
t
Figure 3. Picture of the construction in Lemma 13 with the sequence of stopping times Ti. The crosses × represent
the agents that are dead. The gray region shows the interval It from time T0 = 1 until the sink dies. In our example,
it takes four steps to kill the sink located at the center of the picture.
Using that A0,n = {Xn ≤ 0} where the process (Xn) has been defined in the proof of Lemma 10
and obvious symmetry, we also have
P
(⋂
m
Am,0
)
= P
(⋂
n
A0,n
)
= P (Xn ≤ 0 for all n ≥ 0) = a > 0 (19)
according to Lemma 10. Combining (18) and (19), and using that the events Am,0 and A0,n are
positively correlated, we conclude that
P (z is an ǫ-sink) = P
( ⋂
m,n
Am,n
)
≥ P
(⋂
m
Am,0
)
P
(⋂
n
A0,n
)
= a2 > 0.
This completes the proof. 
To complete the proof of the theorem, the last step is to show that all the ǫ-sinks die even-
tually with probability one, which is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 13 – Assume that x ∈ Z is an ǫ-sink. Then ξt(x) = −1 for some t.
Proof. For all times t, we define
z−t = sup {z ≤ x : ξt(z) = −1} and z
+
t = inf {z ≥ x : ξt(z) = −1}.
In view of (16) and since −1 is an absorbing state for each vertex,
It = (z
−
t , z
+
t ) is bounded at time t = 1 and nonincreasing in t
for the inclusion. Now, set T0 = 1 and define recursively
Ti = inf {t > Ti−1 : It 6= It−} when Ti−1 <∞
= ∞ when Ti−1 =∞
16 N. Lanchier and S. Reed
for all i > 0. See Figure 3 for a picture. Given that time Ti is finite and that the interval ITi is
nonempty, by the definition of ǫ-sink, between time Ti and time Ti+1, the process
Zt = ξt(z
−
Ti
+ 1) + ξt(z
−
Ti
+ 2) + · · · + ξt(z
+
Ti
− 1)
is dominated stochastically by a one-dimensional random walk with a negative drift. This implies
that the expected number of coins in the interval It is decreasing, therefore one of the vertices in
the interval must reach state −1 in a finite time and
P (Ti+1 <∞|Ti <∞ and ITi 6= ∅) = 1.
Recall also that the interval is bounded at time one and observe that, by definition of the stopping
times, the length of the interval decreases by at least one at each step, i.e.,
|IT0 | <∞ and |ITi+1 | ≤ |ITi | − 1 when Ti < Ti+1 <∞.
In summary, it takes only a finite number steps for It to become empty and the duration of each
step is almost surely finite. Since in addition the sink dies at the time It becomes empty,
inf {t : ξt(x) = −1} = inf {t : It = ∅} <∞
with probability one. This completes the proof. 
As previously, since the random variables φz are independent and identically distributed, we may
apply the ergodic theorem which, together with Lemmas 12 and 13, implies that
lim
n→∞
1
2n + 1
n∑
z=−n
1{ξt(z) = −1 for some t}
≥ lim
n→∞
1
2n+ 1
n∑
z=−n
1{z is an ǫ-sink} ≥ a2 > 0.
Since a does not depend on c, this proves Theorem 4.
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